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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, Harvard University Economics Professor
Raymond Vernon foresaw that increased international economic activity
would create profound political problems. He warned that the imminent
growth of multinational enterprises was a threat to national politics
because "multinational enterprises are not easily subjected to national
policy."' Professor Vernon further noted that the threat to national
politics would come not only from multinational enterprises, but also
from the shrinking of trade barriers and advancements in transportation
and communications technologies. "These [changes] are likely to raise
issues of sovereignty that may, in the end, dwarf the multinational
enterprise problem."2
The globalization of the world economy has proceeded at a fast
pace. World trade has displaced domestic trade as the engine of eco-
nomic growth. Direct foreign investment by multinational corporations
has increased dramatically in the past decade. The nations of the world
are quickly aligning themselves into trading blocs. Telecommunication
and computer technologies have made it easier for firms to engage in
production, distribution, and marketing all over the world. Trade barriers
are falling, foreign exchange restrictions are disappearing, and national
borders are more permeable.
While these economic ramifications of the global economy can be
measured, monitored, and described in quantitative terms, there is a
more subtle and equally powerful qualitative change underway. In
essence, the global economy is undermining the capacity of nation-states
to regulate their own domestic economies.
A number of scholars have noted that the global economy diminish-
es the regulatory capability of the nation-state and thus calls into ques-
tion the conventional views of sovereignty.3 The diminished regulatory
1. Raymond Vernon, Future of the Multinational Enterprise, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION 373, 396 (Charles P. Kindleberger ed., 1970).
2. Id. at 399-400.
3. See, e.g., Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, From National Corporatism to
Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market 19 POL. &
Soc'Y 133, 149-50 (1991); Bob Jessop, Changing Forms and Functions of the State in an
Era of Globalization and Regionalization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIVERSITY:
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC ORDER AND DISORDER 102, 103-04 (Robert
Delorne & Kurt Dopfer eds., 1994). See also Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross:
Interaction Between Jurisdictions and Global Regulatory Networks, in REGULATORY COMPE-
TITION AND COORDINATION: STRATEGIES AND DEBATES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION IN
EUROPE AND THE USA (William Bratton et al. eds., forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 4-5, on
file with Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter REGULATORY COMPETITION
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capacity of the nation-state is the result of two distinct factors. First,
within trading blocs, much domestic regulation is superseded by multi-
lateral treaties and tribunals that have de facto, if not de jure, trumping
power. Second, there is a practical limitation on the ability of one nation
to regulate its domestic affairs in a world where labor and capital move
freely across national borders. In such a world, legislation that is oner-
ous to the business community - including most social welfare and
worker protective legislation - tends to induce capital flight and to
trigger a race-to-the-bottom.4 Thus, the nation-state is becoming increas-
ingly powerless to play its historic role as protector of the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens.'
The inability of the nation-state to regulate effectively in the domes-
tic sphere raises troubling social, distributional, and political concerns.
For example, if domestic economies are no longer amenable to domestic
regulation, one can expect an increase in inequality in the distribution of
income, wealth, and power both within nations and between nations.
Furthermore, in a world where domestic states have diminished ability
to regulate their economies, the concepts of politics and sovereignty
become problematic. As globalization proceeds and economic regulation
is increasingly made by transnational bodies, important political ques-
tions arise. What economic power remains with the nation-state? What
will be the role of domestic politics, social movements, and interest
groups? In transnational tribunals and international agencies, who speaks
for the nation and whose interests will be represented as the "national
interest?" And, what is the source of political legitimacy of the
disempowered or reconstructed nation-state?
This article examines the challenge to domestic labor regulation
posed by the increasingly international economic and legal order. Part I
analyzes the several ways in which increased global economic integra-
tion creates problems for labor. These problems include a decline in
union bargaining power, a race-to-the-bottom in labor standards, and a
weakening of labor's role as political actor. Part II identifies four ap-
proaches, or models, for transnational labor regulation that have
emerged in the Western world in the past twenty years. These are: (1)
AND COORDINATION] (contrasting arguments for the diminished economic function of the
nation-state with arguments for an on-going political function for the nation-state).
4. See infra parts L.A-B.
5. As Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller wrote, "[t]he structural transformation of the
world economy through the globalization of Big Business is undermining the power of the
nation-state to maintain economic and political stability within its territory." RICHARD J.
BARNET & RONALD E. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONs 302 (1974).
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preemptive legislation; (2) harmonization; (3) cross-border monitoring;
and (4) extraterritorial jurisdiction. Part III explores the differences
between the four models in terms of their respective abilities to solve
the problems of transnational labor regulation in a global economy. I
conclude that none of the four models can solve all the problems caused
by globalization. Each one involves trade-offs between policy goals.
Therefore, states need to consider the normative and distributional
ramifications of each of the four models, and seek to develop another
model which better addresses the problems of labor regulation in a
global world.
I. THE PROBLEMS FOR LABOR REGULATION IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Over the past thirty years, U.S. unions have seen an explosion of
overseas runaway shops and multinational corporations shifting produc-
tion overseas.6 Globalization hurts domestic labor movements in several
respects: It diminishes labor's bargaining power vis-a-vis its employer, it
creates a disincentive for labor to actively seek labor protective legisla-
tion, it leads to organizational fragmentation, and it causes atrophy of
labor's political clout. Each of these dynamics will be elaborated below.
A. The Decline of Union Bargaining Power
Increased globalization of the world economy means increased
capital mobility. For obvious reasons, corporations prefer to establish
production facilities in countries with lower wage rates, lower labor
standards and fewer labor rights. The resultant business flight to low
wage areas, commonly referred to as the "runaway shop," has been a
concern of Western labor movements for many decades.7
In the United States, the "runaway shop" phenomenon has long been
a problem for the labor movement. United States' corporations began
moving to the South in search of lower wages and lower unionization
rates in the 1920s. In more recent years, corporate flight has been moti-
vated by additional factors such as avoiding state worker compensation
6. Betty Southard Murphy, Multinational Corporations and Free Coordinated Transna-
tional Bargaining: An Alternative to Protectionism?, 28 LAn. L.J. 619, 620-21 (1977).
7. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting
the phenomenon of inter-jursidictional competition for businesses that relocate to those states
with the least onerous regulatory environments); See also David Charny, Competition Among
Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to
the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 423, 430-31 (1991) (discuss-
ing interjurisdictional competition for incorporations).
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systems, state unemployment insurance programs, and other labor pro-
tective programs. Indeed, states with few labor protective regulations
often tout that fact in their advertisements to attract businesses from
more heavily-regulated states.8
Companies that can freely and costlessly relocate to low-wage areas
are unlikely to accede to union demands for higher wages or improved
working conditions. Furthermore, unions, when faced with a credible
threat of corporate relocation, revise their wage demands downward.9 As
a result, the level of a union's bargaining power is a function of the ease
by which companies can in fact relocate production to low wage areas.
As business relocation costs go down and as relocation possibilities
increase, union bargaining clout diminishes.
Global capital flight poses a particularily serious problem for unions
in labor-management negotiations. At present, American labor law does
not give unions the right to bargain about strategic-level corporate
decisions such as whether to relocate across the border or whether to
merge with a foreign corporation.'0 And, firms that are involved in take-
overs or mergers are not required to bring their collective bargaining
obligations into the new corporate entity." Consequently, firms that
relocate from unionized high-wage areas to nonunion low-wage areas
are free to exploit whatever wage differentials exist, and U.S. unions
have few means to resist.
In a frictionless world, companies would exploit any wage and
benefit differentials that existed around the globe, and unions would be
forced to compete with low wage, nonunion workers all over the
globe. 2 While we do not live in a frictionless world, transnational
8. BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA
84 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Michael J. McGuinness, The Protection of Labor Rights in North America:
A Commentary on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 30 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 579, 580-82 (1994) (reporting on numerous studies regarding industrial flight and the
deterioration of industrial conditions); See generally Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling
Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEo. L.J. 1757, 1763-82
(1993) (discussing impact of globalization and capital flight on U.S. workers).
10. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Concep-
tions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 96-119 (1988) [hereinafter Labor
and the Corporate Structure]. See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment
Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 372-73 (1993)
(discussing the inability of unions in the United States to protect their members from unfavor-
able corporate strategic decisions).
11. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991).
12. Within the European Community, low wage countries have opposed wage-equalizing
regulations on the grounds that they should be able to benefit from their low-wage status. See
Berod Baron von Maydell, The Impact of the EEC on Labor Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1401, 1403 (1993).
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runaway shops are occurring with increased frequency due to advances
in communication technology, the increased quantity and velocity of
world trade, and the growth of direct foreign investment and multina-
tional corporations. In addition, the advent of trading blocs, free-trading
zones, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other "free trade"
reforms are removing legal restrictions on capital's ability to flow to
locations which generate the highest returns at the lowest factor costs.
These transnational trade pacts and other "free trade" devices which
facilitate the movement of business across national borders also diminish
labor's bargaining power.
B. The Race-to-the-Bottom Problem
Not only does globalization undermine union bargaining power, it
also undermines union efforts in the legislative arena. When corpora-
tions are free to relocate wherever they want, unions find themselves
placed in a prisoner's dilemma.'3 The more successful unions are in the
political arena at obtaining legislative protections, the more likely busi-
nesses are to relocate to other areas. In that event, workers lose the very
jobs which made the protections desirable in the first place. Further-
more, without jobs, workers are usually worse off than they were before
the protections were obtained. This is the dilemma of labor regulation
that globalization creates. It is the result of the "race-to-the-bottom" -
the flight of capital to areas with lower regulatory standards.
Today labor unions face two different race-to-the-bottom dynamics.
First, they confront a race in which multinational firms, searching for
lower production costs, move production from high wage countries to
low wage countries by means of capital flight and direct foreign invest-
ment. This concern, while not new for American unions, has intensified
with increased globalization.
Second, the advent of free trade pacts and the lowering of trade
barriers has created a new type of race-to-the-bottom problem for labor.
Countries now have an incentive to compete for business by altering
their domestic regulations in order to create a regulatory environment
that business will find attractive. This problem has been termed "regula-
13. On the theory of the prisoner's dilemma, see Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL
CHOICE 1, 8-9 (Jon Elster ed., 1986). On the application of the prisoner's dilemma paradox to
regulatory choices, see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210, 1217-18 (1992) (discussing application of prisoner's dilemma analogy to competi-
tion between states to avoid environmental regulations).
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tory competition."' 4 Many scholars have discussed the possibility that
regulatory competition will lead to the deregulation of banking practices
and financial markets, the easing of environmental regulations, the
weakening of product liability and other tort law rules, and the lowering
of labor standards in the years ahead.
15
Both strands of the "race-to-the-bottom" problem weaken labor in
the political arena insofar as they create disincentives for labor to lobby
for protective legislation. They thus serve to deprive labor of one impor-
tant tool for worker betterment - legislative action. However, the
second type of race-to-the-bottom, regulatory competition, is more
problematic for labor than the conventional one. While the traditional
race-to-the-bottom undermined labor's incentive to seek legislative
gains, regulatory competition undermines political support for existing
American labor standards throughout the electorate. The threat of busi-
ness flight creates interest groups that want to use low levels of labor
regulation to attract business. This in turn could trigger a deregulatory
spiral in which countries compete for business on the basis of their low
labor standards. Domestically, this spiral would be deeply divisive
within labor groups, setting organized workers against unorganized ones,
workers with jobs against the unemployed, and all workers against both
the poor and small businesses.
Recently, commentators have suggested that, at least within a single
country, the existence of multiple jurisdictions with multiple regulatory
frameworks does not necessarily create sub-optimal levels of regulation
or otherwise impair public welfare.' 6 These commentators argue that
there is no race-to-the-bottom problem, at least in the area of environ-
mental regulation. They point out that when enacting environmental
regulations, local governments make a tradeoff between environmental
quality and tax revenues from businesses. The resultant level of regula-
tion reflects the locality's preferences between these two incommensu-
14. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externaliza-
tion, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993) (discussing the dynamics of regulatory
competition in the area of unilateral U.S. disciplines and the multilateral GATIr).
15. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Rethinking US. Securities Laws in the Shadow of Interna-
tional Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 157.
16. See Revesz, supra note 13; N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Wallace E. Oates & Robert
M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion
Inducing? 35 J. PuB. ECON. 333 (1988); William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental
Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities, in FISCAL ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS 119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975). See also Joel R.
Paul, Free Trade, Regulatory Competition, and the Autonomous Market Fallacy, 1 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 29, 62 (1995) (arguing that regulatory competition has not operated in the Europe-
an Community in the area of waste packing regulations).
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rate goals. Thus, these theorists conclude, there is not a race-to-the-
bottom problem, but rather a variety of policy mixes that are tailored to
a particular locality's preferences. For these scholars, the existence of
multiple jurisdictions and capital mobility fosters a desirable political
forum for arriving at policy goals, rather than creating a prisoner's
dilemma. 
17
This argument might hold true in the environmental area where the
pro-environment groups and the pro-business groups are two different
constituencies contending for their respective positions in a local policy-
making forum. In such a context, one could describe the resultant level
of regulation as a compromise that reflects the relative power of the two
contending factions, a compromise that could be reached at a different
point in" a different locality where the two groups have different relative
bargaining strengths. However, whatever the merits of this argument as
applied to environmental regulation, it does not apply to labor regula-
tion.'8
Labor regulation involves a different type of prisoner's dilemma
than that present in the area of environmental regulation. 9 Unlike the
environmental area, labor regulation does not involve two opposed
parties, each of which is able to articulate and advocate its own separate
interest in a policy arena. Rather, with labor regulation, the group that
stands to benefit the most from regulation is also the group that has the
most to lose from any resultant business flight caused by the regulation.
Thus, in contrast to environmental regulations, the level of a locality's
labor regulation is not a tradeoff between conflicting interest groups,
each with its separate constituency, urging incommensurate policy goals.
Instead, the likelihood of a labor standards race-to-the-bottom places
labor in a Hobson's choice in which it cannot advocate the policies that
would benefit it the most.
17. Revesz, supra note 13, at 1233-44 (arguing that interstate competition is not incon-
sistent with maximization of social welfare). See also Charny, supra note 7, at 437-38
(describing conditions under which a race-to-the-bottom in the field of corporate regulation
will and will not occur).
18. Indeed, the theorists of environmental regulation expressly disavow any employment
effects from the social choice between levels of environmental regulation. If employment
effects are not only considered, but made central, then the analysis comes out quite different-
ly. See Brian A. Langille, Competing Conceptions of Regulatory Competition, in REGULATO-
RY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION, supra note 3 (manuscript at 10-13, on file with
Michigan Journal of International Law).
19. On the prisoner's dilemma of labor regulation in the face of international trade, see
Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour
and the Environment 61 (Jan. 6, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Michigan
Journal of International Law).
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C. Organizational Fragmentation
One strategy employed by unions within the United States to dimin-
ish the possibility of runaway shops and race-to-the-bottom problems
has been to advocate federal legislation that would equalize standards
for particular labor issues.2° For example, the rationale for the U.S.
Congressional enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in
1970 was to prevent firms from relocating in states with lower standards
for occupational health and safety protection by promulgating national
occupational safety and health standards and enforcement mechanisms.2 1
Another union stategy has been to organize workers in low wage states
and attempt to bargain for equal labor standards between states. Operat-
ing under a single set of federal labor laws, unions in a single country
such as the United States have often been able to promote wage parity
and limit internal capital movement.
However, when corporations move beyond national boundaries, the
countervailing pressures that work well within a single country operate
weakly, if at all, in the global landscape. There is little prospect for
obtaining supervening legislation to equalize labor standards, and very
few prospects for cross-union cooperation. With the exception of Cana-
da, U.S. unions have little experience organizing or jointly bargaining
with unions in other countries or operating under foreign legal regimes.22
In addition, other countries have labor laws and collective bargaining
systems that are quite different from the laws and collective bargaining
systems of the United States. Consequently, it is difficult for U.S. un-
ions to collaborate with unions in other countries in a way that jointly
harnesses their economic weapons and furthers their joint bargaining
goals.
American unions know that without cooperation across national
lines, they are forced to compete with foreign unions to keep domestic
businesses at home, to attract foreign businesses to the U.S., and to keep
foreign workers from immigrating to U.S. soil. Yet they have had
difficulty formulating an effective response to the problem of interna-
tional runaway shops. They have advocated a grab-bag of policies
20. Marley S. Weiss, The Impact of the European Community on Labor Law: Some
American Comparisons, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1427, 1439 (1993). See also Baron von
Maydell, supra note 12, at 1411-17 (discussing EU low wage countries' opposition to wage-
equalizing regulation).
21. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1988). See SUSAN
RosE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 85-90 (1992) (analyzing the
policy justifications behind the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
22. Murphy, supra note 6, at 626.
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including restrictions on immigration, opposition to trade agreements,
changes in tax rules, and legal restrictions on multinational corpora-
tions.23 At the same time, U.S. unions have sought to establish, or
strengthen, cooperative relations with unions overseas, but such efforts
are still in embryonic stages.24 These somewhat contradictory impulses
are in fact related - they represent efforts to limit global runaway
shops which, in the current international and economic climate, seem
inevitable.25
D. The Deterioration of Labor's Political Role
A further problem caused by globalization is that labor's political
power is weakened when the locus of labor regulation moves from a
national to an international arena. National labor movements operate in
the context of a particular regulatory environment. National and local
legal regulations set labor standards and shape labor-management bar-
gaining arrangements. Until now, these regulations have been deter-
mined at the level of national politics.
Accordingly, labor organizations have directed considerable efforts
toward securing favorable national labor regulations. By uniting other-
wise diverse labor groups around a common legislative agenda, unions
in most Western countries have been able to organize at the national
level and have become effective players in national politics. However, if
the locus of labor regulation is shifted to transnational tribunals, there is
little advantage for national labor movements to mobilize and press for
gains through the domestic political process. If labor regulation is not
determined at the level of the nation-state, national labor movements
lose much of their political clout. And without political clout, labor's
ability to maintain a regulatory regime which gives labor bargaining
power in the economic realm would be seriously compromised.26
More significantly, if labor ceases to be a voice in national politics,
then the democratic nature of our government is also undermined. Social
23. Id. at 624-26.
24. See Sheldon Friedman, The EC vs. NAFTA: Levelling Up vs. Social Dumping, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1421 (1993) (comparing EC labor policy with NAFTA's silence).
25. The race-to-the bottom problem is not limited to the United States. Other high labor
standard countries have also experienced capital movements to countries with lower labor
standards - including recent movements of capital from Canada to the United States after the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1988. See generally Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851, 27
I.L.M. 281 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (entering into force Jan.
1, 1989).
26. On the role of legal rules in constituting bargaining power, see Stone, Labor and the
Corporate Structure, supra note 10, at 85-86.
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theorists dating back to Toqueville have recognized that a robust democ-
racy requires that there be a plethora of voluntary organizations in
which citizens can participate. 27 Voluntary organizations are the vehicle
by which citizens' private concerns are shared and translated into public
issues, issues which can then generate pressure for legislative or elector-
al action. Without voluntary organizations, it is virtually impossible in a
modern democracy for groups to articulate shared concerns and bring
their interests into the political arena.
The labor union, as a voluntary organization whose purpose is to
promote the interest of its constituents, functions not merely as an
economic workplace-based organization, but also as a political lobbying
group and electoral block. Collectively, labor unions articulate the
interests and public policy concerns of a large segment of the popula-
tion. Without labor unions' continued presence in national politics, this
segment would be silenced, and the democratic process would be dimin-
ished.28
II. FOUR MODELS OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION
Given the many respects in which globalization represents a threat
to domestic labor movements and labor regulatory regimes, most trade
unionists and many labor relations professionals have viewed the rapid
march of globalization with alarm. The question of whether the orga-
nized labor movements in the Western world can protect their gains in a
global economy has been discussed, debated, and bemoaned at length
over the past ten years. Despite a pervasive sense of gloom, there has
been some optimistic speculation that alternative forms of labor regula-
tion might emerge in the post-trading bloc world. For example, it is
sometimes posited that transnational labor institutions will develop, and
transnational labor standards will be adopted, that will replace a national
labor regulatory regime with an international one. This scenario suggests
that transnational labor standards will emerge, along with transnational
labor movements to implement them and multilateral tribunals to en-
force them, which will reproduce at the international level the
protections labor currently enjoys domestically.
27. ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., Schoken
Books 1961) (1835). See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971); ROBERT A. DAHL,
WHO GOVERNS (1961).
28. On the role of unionism on the democratic process, see Thomas C. Kohler, Civic
Virtue at Work Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 300-02
(1995).
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This view is not wholly fanciful - there are some developments in
the European Union (EU) to support it - but it is a bit rosy-eyed.29 It
neglects the crucial questions of which regulations will prevail at the
multilateral level and how they will be enforced.' The rosy-eyed view
also ignores the fact that at present there are no serious cross-border
labor organizations which can engage in multilateral bargaining.3 Fur-
thermore, it avoids the problem of how multilateral agencies - agencies
whose relationship to any particular political constituency is attenuated
to begin with - will be persuaded to adopt protective labor regulations
in the first place.32
Rather than embark on an imaginary journey into possible forms of
labor regulation in a post-trading bloc world, it makes sense to begin
with an analysis of the types of transnational labor regulation that are
emerging in fact. Examining developments in the EU and in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), we can identify four distinct
types or models of transnational labor regulation - each one possessing
particular strengths and weaknesses and each one embodying a unique
theory of the role of domestic labor regulation.
A. Two European Approaches to Transnational
Labor Regulation
Each of the member states of the European Union has its own legal
history, customs, norms, and cultures that have shaped its system of
labor rights. Each state has developed a large body of legal rules, stat-
utes, regulations and procedures which establish employment standards
for individual workers, including statutory minimum wages, unemploy-
ment and job training provisions, and so forth. In addition, each EU
country has its own distinct legal and institutional structure of collective
bargaining which differs markedly from each of the others.
29. See Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 3, at 152-53 (contrasting emerging Single
European Community with Pre-existing European Welfare states).
30. See, e.g., Benjamin Rozwood & Andrew R. Walker, Side Agreements, Sidesteps, and
Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free Trade in North America, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333,
342 (1993) (discussing difficulty of finding shared normative standards for employment
protections between the United States and Mexico).
31. Baron von Maydell, supra note 12, at 1416, 1418-19. But see Friedman, supra note
24, at 1422 (discussing the emergence of European-wide trade union councils within particu-
lar corporations).
32. See Peter Ludlow, The Maastricht Treaty and the Future of Europe, WASHINGTON
Q., Autumn 1992, at 119, 132 (discussing problem of legitimacy and democracy within the
EU). See also Stephen Gill, The Emerging World Order and European Change: The Political
Economy of European Union, in SOCIALIST REGISTER 1992 157, 166 (Ralph Milibard & Leo
Panitch eds., 1992) (problem of lack of political legitimacy and democratic accountability in
European integration).
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For example, German labor laws provide for industry-wide unions
which engage in industry-wide collective bargaining at the national-
level. At the same time, German unions have the legal right to partici-
pate both on corporate boards of directors and in work councils at the
workplace. 33 In France, there are several competing national unions in
each industry, each of which engages in bargaining at both the national
and local level, resulting in fragmented bargaining. There are no legally
established co-determination rights but there are extensive protections
for individual employment and for collective action. 4 In Great Britain,
unions engage in collective bargaining but have no co-determination
rights and relatively few legally enforceable rights of any sort.35 Other
countries have other union structures and legal regimes of collective
bargaining, all of which give protection to some form of collective
bargaining, but no two of which are identical. In addition, EU countries
differ on the forum used to enforce collective labor rights some have a
system of labor courts to enforce collective labor rights, some rely on
specialized administrative tribunals, and some on courts of general
jurisdiction.
The EU addresses this plurality of regulation in two ways. One
approach, known as preemptive legislation, includes treaty provisions
and EU reglements that are directly applicable to citizens of the member
states. These regulations set uniform 'rules for certain labor rights and
have priority over conflicting national legislation. Thus, they are a form
of unified transnational labor legislation.
The other approach is known as harmonization. Harmonization
involves structured incentives and pressures created by the EU legal
rules which induce the member states to bring their separate labor laws
into conformity. Harmonization occurs directly, through EU Directives,
and indirectly through collateral regulations. It is a strategy of regulation
that is based both upon the short-term acceptance of differences in regu-
latory regimes and the assumption that, over time, these differences will
fade and there will emerge one set of norms, rules and procedures.
33. See Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A
Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMp. L. 367 (1980). See also
Lawrence S. Zakson, Note, Worker Participation: Industrial Democracy and Managerial
Prerogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the United States, 8 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 93, 114-26 (1984).
34. Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Worker Involvement in Management Decisions in France, 58
TUL. L. REV. 1332, 1345-47 (1984). See generally MICHAEL DESPAX & JACQUES ROJOT,
LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN FRANCE (1987).
35. LORD WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW 343 (3d ed. 1986).
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1. Preemptive Legislation
The European Economic Community Treaty (EEC Treaty) sets out
specific provisions of supranational law in certain areas, and sets up
structures for EU-wide regulation in other areas. There are very few
specific provisions in the EEC Treaty that bear directly on labor law.
The few labor provisions that do exist can be found in Title III, The
Free Movement of Persons, Services, and Capital. Under Title III, there
are provisions concerning the freedom of movement of employees, and
provisions concerning the treatment of and social benefits for migrant
workers.36 There are also provisions concerning professional workers.37
Elsewhere in the EEC Treaty there are provisions that mandate equal
treatment between male and female workers.3" However, these provi-
sions state general principles, and have not, in themselves, given rise to
enforceable rights.39
The EEC Treaty also established a Social Fund, the goal of which is
to provide vocational training and resettlement allowances for displaced
workers, and to enable workers to be geographically and occupationally
mobile.' The Social Fund does not give workers employment rights nor
does it regulate labor conditions. It merely cushions the transition period
for dislocated workers.
In addition to the principles of labor protection contained in the
EEC Charter, the EU Council of Ministers has the power to enact
specific labor regulations (r~glements) that are consistent with the Char-
ter.4"' To date, the EU has promulgated very few r~glements on labor
matters.42 The few that have been published deal with migrant workers,
occupational safety and health, and equality between men and women.4 3
36. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] arts.
48-52.
37. EEC TREATY arts. 59-62.
38. EEC TREATY art. 119.
39. See Brian Bercusson, Maastrict: A Fundamental Change in European Labour Law,
23 INDUS. REL. J. 177, 178 (1992).
40. EEC TREATY arts. 123-128.
41. See Baron von Maydell, supra note 12, at 1406-07 (discussing legislative compe-
tence rules established by the EEC Treaty).
42. Weiss, supra note 20, at 1435-37.
43. Commission Regulation 1612/68 of October 15, 1968, 1968 J.O. (L 257) 2 (free
movement of workers); Commission Regulation 1251/70 of June 29, 1970, 1970 J.O. (L 142)
24 (migrant workers' right to remain in Member State); Commission Regulation 1408171 of
June 14, 1971, 1971 J.O. (L 49) 2 (vesting and portability of pensions for migrant workers);
Commission Regulation OJC 6271 of October 16, 1991 (establishing European Agency for
Safety and Health). The issue of equal pay between men and women is specifically provided
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In 1989, European lawmakers attempted to enact a Community
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (known as the "Social
Charter"). The Social Charter contained a list of "Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers," which included occupational health and safety
protections, guarantees for the right to organize and bargain collectively,
rights to adequate social welfare benefits, workplace consultation and
participation rights, and protection for children, older workers, and the
disabled." Eleven of the twelve member states approved the Social
Charter - all but the United Kingdom. As a result, the eleven states
that ratified the Social Charter have treated it as a mandate for the
European Commission to formulate directives for the protection of labor
and the promotion of collective bargaining.45
2. Harmonization
As discussed, the EEC Treaty makes it possible to unify some
employment rights by means of multilateral r~glements, but the Council
of Ministers has not yet pursued this course of action. Rather, in most
instances, the Council has attempted to encourage its member nations to
"harmonize" their labor and employment laws. The goal of harmoniza-
tion is to provide incentives for convergence, or what the EU scholars
call "approximation," between collective bargaining systems.4 Harmon-
ization occurs in two ways: through EU Directive, and through indirect
pressures imposed by regulation in other areas that have a collateral
impact on labor matters.
(a) Direct Harmonization
An EU directive is a regulation enacted by the EU Council which
the member states must then enact into their domestic legislation. There
is a time period within which the member states are required to "trans-
pose" the directive into their own domestic law.47 Usually the directive
sets minimum standards in a particular area which the member states
must then "transpose" in ways that are consistent with their own distinct
labor law system.
in the EEC TREATY, art. 119, and the courts have held that this provision is directly enforce-
able by EU citizens. See Case 43/75, Defreene v. Sabera, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 2 C.M.L.R. 98
(1976). See generally Weiss, supra note 20, at 1436-37.
44. See Friedman, supra note 24, at 1423.
45. Bercusson, supra note 39, at 179. .
46. Baron von Maydell, supra note 12, at 1409.
47. Weiss, supra note 21, at 1442.
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There are presently EU Directives in effect in several areas of labor
regulation. In 1975, the EU lawmakers adopted a directive on collective
redundancies, also known as dismissals for economic reasons. This
directive provided that firms who intend to implement a mass layoff
must notify workers affected and confer with the worker representa-
tives.48 In 1977 a directive designed to protect workers faced with
takeovers and other changes in the ownership of their firms was adopt-
ed.49 The 1977 directive provides that employees of companies that were
involved in a transfer of ownership of the entire company or a part
thereof must have their preexisting contractual rights, including collec-
tive bargaining rights, honored by the new entity. A 1980 directive on
insolvencies provided that firms must guarantee payment of workers'
outstanding wage claims and benefits prior to the commencement of
insolvency proceedings.'
There have also been directives addressing workplace safety and
health and equal treatment for women and men."' In addition, the EU is
considering several directives concerning part-time workers, service
workers and temporary workers. 2
In 1992 at Maastricht, eleven of the twelve EU member states
agreed to a Protocol on Social Policy.53 In the negotiations leading up to
the Maastricht Agreement, there were considerable pressures to enlarge
the EEC Treaty's social policy provisions. Due to the United Kingdom's
continued opposition, however, there was no unanimous agreement.
Instead, provisions based on 'the previous Social Charter were annexed
as a Social Agreement accepted by all except the UK, and these eleven
member states were authorized by the Protocol on Social Policy to
utilize the mechanisms of the EEC for the purposes of implementing
48. Council Directive 75/129, 1975 O.. (L 48) 29. This directive was interpreted
narrowly by the European Court in Case 284/83, Dansk Metalarbejderforbund v. H. Nielson
& Son, 1985 E.C.R. 553. See generally Weiss, supra note 20, at 1449-56 (comparing EC
directive on mass layorfs with Workers Adjustment and Retraining Act (WARN) under
American labor law).
49. Council Directive 77/187, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26. See Case 324/86, Foreningen AF
Arbejdsledere v. Daddy's Dance Hall, 1988 E.C.R. 739 (holding that an employee cannot
waive the rights conferred by the mandatory provisions of Directive 77/187). See also Weiss,
supra note 20 at 1457-59 (comparing transfer of ownership directive to successorship rights
under American labor law).
50. Council Directive 80/987, 1980 0.J. (L 283) 23. See Weiss, supra note.20, at 1449
(comparing directive on insolvencies to workers rights under U.S. federal bankruptcy law).
51. See John T. Addison & Stanley Siebert, Recent Developments in Social Policy in the
New European Union, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5, 8-13 (1994) (tables showing passage
of various Directives).
52. Bercusson, supra note 39, at 179-80.
53. d. at 182.
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that Agreement. This UK 'opt-out' means that the Social Policy propos-
als which the UK government is unwilling to accept may be agreed
upon among the other member states and become binding on all except
the UK.
The Maastrict Protocol, also known as the Social Agreement, made
a number of changes in the manner in which labor directives are imple-
mented.' Most significantly, it provided that labor directives can be
implemented through collective bargaining agreements as well as
through legislation and administrative regulation.55 In addition, the 1992
Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy expanded the legislative capacity
of the EU. It set out a series of issues on which the EU could legislate
on the basis of majority voting, rather than unanimity which had previ-
ously been required.56 These areas include health and safety protection,
working conditions, workers' information and consultation rights, and
equality between men and women.
Article 2(6) of the Social Agreement makes it clear that most collec-
tive labor rights are excluded from majority voting. It states that "the
provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association,
the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs. 57 Thus, unanimous
voting was retained for directives in the areas of job security, represen-
tation, and collective defense of workers' interests.58
To date, the EU has not attempted to legislate or harmonize in the
field of collective bargaining law. 59 It has, however, attempted to legis-
late works councils. In September 1994, the first Directive was issued
under the Social Agreement, providing for the establishment of Europe-
an Works Councils or other consultative procedures by all European
multinational enterprises.' These are workplace-based organizations-
established for the purpose of consultation and sharing information, not
for purposes of providing worker representation. A number of multina-
54. For a thorough discussion of the Maastricht Protocol, see ROGER BLANPAIN, LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND
31-54 (1992).
55. Bercusson, supra note 39, at 181-84. This change increases the role of collective
bargaining within the EC, yet it also creates the possibility that the protections contained in
certain directives can be bargained away.
56. Id. at 182-83; Weiss, supra note 20, at 1431-32.
57. Bercusson, supra note 39, at 183.
58. Blanpain, supra note 54, at 39-40.
59. Baron von Maydell, supra note 12, at 1416. Brian Bercusson has noted that the
implementation of community labor law through collective bargaining has attained recognition
in the EU, and may lead to future EU directives regarding collective bargaining. See
Bercusson, supra note 39, at 181-82.
60. Council Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64.
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tionals have moved to set up such Works Councils, and although it is
not legally binding on the UK, some have included their UK workers in
the arrangements. 6'
EU directives have force only to the extent that they are implement-
ed by the member states. As a consequence, the actual meaning of the
directives can vary greatly between states. However, in Francovich v.
Italy, a landmark decision in 1991, the European Court of Justice ruled
that a member country could be held liable to an individual worker for
restitution if it failed to enact a labor protection directive.62 In that case,
two Italian workers sued the Italian government for failing to implement
the 1980 Directive concerning worker protection in the event of an
employer's insolvency. The Court ruled that it is "inherent in the Treaty
system" that the member states are liable to individuals who are dam-
aged by the state's failure to implement directives.63 This decision will
give added enforcement power to the directives, and may lead to a
uniform interpretation of the precise rights and protections contained in
them. If that happens, the directives will come to resemble the preemp-
tive legislation of the r~glements discussed above.
(b) Indirect Harmonization
In addition to harmonization by means of EU labor directives, the
EU can harmonize labor regulation indirectly by means of regulations
and directives in other areas of law. For example, labor policy is impli-
cated by regulations and directives in the area of corporate law. The EU
has a long-standing draft directive on the structure of stock corporations
and a proposal for a European-wide stock corporation. However, the
proposals have not yet been enacted, due largely to disagreement about
the proper role of labor in the structure of the corporation. Some mem-
ber states have extensive codetermination rights for workers built into
their current laws on corporate structures, while some states do not. The
EU states have not been able to agree whether or not to include
codetermination rights in the EU directive on corporate structure, so the
directive has not yet been adopted. 64 However, if any directive on corpo-
rate structure were adopted, it would have a profound effect on labor's
participation rights in all EU nations.65
61. Robert Taylor, Entering Into A New Direction, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 1995, at 11.
62. Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357,
67 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993). But see id. at 1-5414 (discussing qualifications of the right to
damages).
63. Id at 1-5414, 67 C.M.L.R. at 114.
64. Baron von Maydell, supra note 12, at 1414-15; Murphy, supra note 6, at 627-28.
See also Weiss, supra note 20, at 1461-62.
65. Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 3, at 152.
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Similarly, any EU directive on insolvency could have a significant
impact on labor. For example, French insolvency law has, as one of its
primary objectives, the preservation of workers' jobs. Under French
bankruptcy law, this objective has a higher priority than the protection
of stockholders. 66 If this principle is carried over into a European-wide
bankruptcy code, it could give labor unions substantial participation
rights in bankruptcy proceedings and a greater role in the structure of
their firms. 67
3. Observations about the European Approaches
As we have seen, the EU has utilized r~glements and directives to
set minimum standards in some areas of employment regulation, but it
has not attempted to harmonize collective labor regulations. The differ-
ent approaches toward individual employment regulation and collective
labor regulation is understandable in the context of European labor
relations systems. Prior to European integration, each EU country had its
own legislation establishing a bundle of minimal terms for employment
contracts - terms such as minimum wage rates, old age assistance,
maximum hours, occupational health and safety protection, health insur-
ance, disability provisions, or job security protection. Frequently these
employment standards were similar in structure but differed in their
quantitative dimension, such as the precise amount of the minimum
wage or the total sum paid for a particular disability. Because the differ-
ences between countries' labor standards were quantitative rather than
qualitative, it has been possible to devise a single set of minimal terms
which all member countries are required to adopt. Once a unified set of
minimal terms is mandated, each country can adjust its own terms
upward or downward to comply with the mandate. No vested interests
are disrupted, no labor leaders lose their constituencies, no labor lawyers
lose the value of their expertise, and no individual workers lose their
jobs. Thus it has been feasible to develop transnational labor standards
for individual labor rights within the EU, and to make them mandatory
by means of EU-level legislation.
However, when it comes to transnational regulation of collective
labor relations, neither harmonization nor preemptive legislation is likely
to be a simple expedient. In the area of collective bargaining, each
country's own institutions, customs, and labor relations practices have
given rise to labor organizations, employer organizations, and labor
66. See CHRISTOPHER LIVIDAS, WINDING-UP OF INSOLVENT COMPANIES IN ENGLAND
AND FRANCE 281-82 (1983).
67. Cf. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure, supra note 10, at 160 (on participation
rights for labor under U.S. bankruptcy code).
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relations professionals who have a vested stake in the continuation of
their own national system. Each country's incumbent labor relations
personae, whether they represent a management, labor or neutral per-
spective, can be expected to resist efforts at transformations that threaten
their own particular niche, role, or expertise. They will resist any trans-
national regulation that attempts to supersede those local regulations,
even one that would benefit their own country's labor movement gener-
ally. Hence, for collective labor rights, both harmonization and preemp-
tion may be slow to develop.'
B. Two North American Approaches to
Transnational Labor Regulation
In North America, there has been no attempt to harmonize collective
bargaining systems or to unify labor standards, but there has neverthe-
less been an expansion of transnational labor regulation. This has oc-
curred in two ways: (1) The North American Free Trade Agreement's
(NAFTA's) mechanisms for cross-border monitoring and enforcement of
labor standards; and (2) extraterritorial application of U.S. labor law.
Both North American models of transnational labor regulation create
mechanisms through which the labor laws of one country are applied to
citizens or corporations located in another country.
The North American models of transnational labor regulation differ
from the European ones in that the cross-border application of labor
laws in the North American models is neither cumulative nor on-going.
Rather, the two North American models provide a means by which
citizens of one country are given rights or obligations under another
country's labor laws on a one-time, single-use basis. NAFTA's cross-'
border monitoring and enforcement permits one country 'to enforce
another country's labor laws in a multilateral tribunal. Extraterritorial
jurisdiction permits one country to enforce its own labor laws against
another country in its own tribunal. Neither model involves changing the
labor laws of any country. In contrast to the two European models
discussed above, the two North American models do not attempt to
integrate the separate systems of domestic labor regulation. Rather, they
embody an approach to transnational regulation that can be termed the
interpenetration of two legal systems, the temporary incursion of one
distinct and autonomous system of regulation into a separate one. The
68. On the difficulties of developing a unified position within the EC, see Lowell Turner,
Beyond National Unionism?, in THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF LABOR POLITICS (Richard
Locke & Kathleen Thelen eds., forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 11-12, on file with Michi-
gan Journal of International Law). See also Peter Lange, The Politics of the Social Dimen-
sion, in EURO-POLITICS: INSTITUTES AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 225 (Albert M. Sbragia ed., 1992).
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North American models do not aim to facilitate convergence and ulti-
mate unification of regulatory systems, as is the goal of the European
models of labor regulation. Instead, the North American models permit
temporary, limited-purpose forays by participants of one system into the
affairs of another.
1. Cross-Border Monitoring and Enforcement
The NAFTA was signed by the heads of state of Mexico, Canada,
and the United States in 1992, and ratified by the respective national
legislatures in 1993. Many of its provisions became effective in January
1994. The initial goal of the treaty is to eliminate friction in the mobili-
ty of capital and goods between Mexico, Canada, and the United
States. 69 NAFTA's ultimate goal is to create a trans-American free trade
bloc.
In August 1993, before NAFTA was submitted to the U.S. Congress
for approval, President Clinton negotiated a side accord on labor cooper-
ation, known as the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("NAFTA Labor Side Agreement"), 70 in an effort to address concerns
raised by organized labor that NAFTA would cause massive job loSS. 7'
The groups that advocated a NAFTA Labor Side Agreement hoped it
would lead to equal and fair labor standards throughout the trading
bloc.72
The NAFTA Labor Side Agreement that was negotiated did not
imitate the European models of transnational labor regulation. It does
not seek to equalize or establish a minimum floor of labor standards or
labor rights.73 Unlike the power that the EU Commission has to enact
labor-related rbglements and directives under the EEC Treaty, the agen-
cies established by the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement have no authority
over the actual labor standards of the member countries. Neither does
69. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. 289, 297.
70. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993,
H.R. Doc. No. 160, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 48, 32 I.L.M. 1502 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA
Labor Side Agreement].
71. For a detailed chronology and analysis of organized labor's opposition to NAFTA,
see Jefferson Cowie, The Search for a Transnational Labor Discourse for a North American
Economy: A Critical Review of U.S. Labor's Campaign Against NAFTA (1994) (Working
Paper #13, Duke-University of North Carolina Program in Latin American Studies).
72. Rozwood & Walker, supra note 30, at 335. See also Morley Gunderson, Labor
Adjustment Under NAFTA: Canadian Issues, 4 N. AM. OUTLOOK 3, 11-13 (discussing the
Canadian labor movement's concerns regarding NAFTA). '
73. See Jefferson Cowie & John D. French, NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: A Textual
Analysis, 9 LATIN AM. LAB. NEws 5 (1993-94) (Center for Labor Research and Studies of
Fla. Int'l University).
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the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement attempt to harmonize collective
bargaining regulation so as to bring labor conditions between countries
into parity. To the contrary, the NAFTA Side Agreement states that no
country is required to alter its labor standards in any way.74 The NAFTA
Labor Side Agreement merely addresses the enforcement of each coun-
try's existing labor laws.
The only discussion of substantive labor protections in the NAFTA
Labor Side Agreement is contained in Article I, which notes that one of
the objectives of the Side Agreement is to "promote, to the maximum
extent possible, the labor principles set out in Annex 1."75 Annex 1
establishes guiding principles that each country should promote in its
own way the ideals of (1) protecting the right to organize, bargain and
strike; (2) prohibiting forced labor, child labor, sub-minimal wages, and
employment discrimination; and (3) promoting equal pay for equal
work, occupational safety and health, and equal treatment for migrant
workers.76 These "labor principles" are stated in a general way, as
aspirations rather than as enforceable obligations.
While the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement sets no substantive em-
ployment standards, it does provide procedures to ensure that the signa-
tory states enforce their own labor laws. However, the procedures do not
apply to all the labor laws of the states. The NAFTA Labor Side Agree-
ment's procedures only apply to the enforcement of a country's labor
laws pertaining to occupational health and safety, child labor, and mini-
mum wages.77 Notwithstanding whether the laws of each country are
weak or strong, the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement provides that in
those three areas, the laws should be enforced. Consequently, the proce-
dures for labor law enforcement in the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement
do not attempt to create unified labor standards, even in the areas to
which they pertain.
The NAFTA cross-border enforcement procedures provide that when
one country believes that another country is failing to enforce its labor
laws in the three areas covered - safety, child labor, and minimum
wages - that country can bring a complaint to the Commission for
Labor Cooperation ("the Commission").7' The Commission, consisting
of a Secretariat and the labor minister of each member state, will then
74. NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, supra note 70, art. 2, H.R. Doc. 160 at 51, 32
I.L.M. at 1503.
75. Id. art. l(b), at 50, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
76. d. annex 1, at 80-82, 32 I.L.M. at 1515-16.
77. Id. arts. 4-5, 49, at 52, 76-78, 32 I.L.M. at 1503-04, 1513-14.
78. Id. arts. 8-14, at 54-60, 32 I.L.M. at 1504-07 (describing makeup and function of
council).
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attempt to resolve the dispute through consultation and cooperation. 7
Each of the three signatory states must establish a National Administra-
tive Office (NAO) to provide information to the Commission.' If the
dispute is not resolved through consultation by the Commission, one of
the three states may request that an Evaluation Committee of Experts
(ECE) be convened.8 1 The ECE is comprised of three members selected
by the Council.8 2 Its task is two-fold: (1) it considers whether there has
been a pattern or practice of nonenforcement of the relevant labor
standard, so long as the labor standard is health and safety-related or
otherwise within the three covered areas; and (2) it determines whether
the labor standard is "covered by mutually recognized labor laws. 83 The
ECE has 120 days to issue a preliminary report 4 and another 60 days to
make a final report.85
After the final report is issued, the two countries not targeted by
the report may request further consultations on the issue of whether
there has been a persistent pattern of nonenforcement by the third coun-
try. 6 If accord is still not reached, any country may request a special
session of the Council to resolve the dispute. 7 If the dispute is still not
resolved within another 60 days, any country may make a written re-
quest for arbitration.88 An arbitration is held if two-thirds of the Council
members vote affirmatively to send the dispute to arbitration. 9 Under
the Side Agreement, a five member arbitration panel has a maximum of
240 days to submit its final report.'
The cross-border enforcement procedures are clearly drawn-out and
cumbersome. In addition, they are laced with qualifiers and exceptions.
79. Id. arts. 20-26, at 62-65, 32 I.L.M. at 1507-09. For a detailed description of the
NAFrA Labor Side Agreement's enforcement procedures, see McGuinness, supra note 9, at
582-87; Cowie & French, supra note 73 (discussing NAFTA Labor Side Agreement's provi-
sions on enforcement); Gilles Trudeau & Guylaine Vallee, Economic Integration and Labour
Policy in Canada, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NORTH
AMERICA (Maria L. Cook & Harry C. Katz eds., 1994).
80. NAFA Labor Side Agreeement, supra note 70, arts. 15-16, H.R. Doc. 160 at
60-61, 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
81. Id. art. 23, at 63, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
82. Id. art. 24, at 63-64, 32 1.L.M. at 1508.
83. Id. annex 23, at 83, 32 I.L.M. at 1516.
84. Id. art. 25, at 64-65, 32 I.L.M. at 1508--09.
85. Id. art. 26, at 65, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
86. Id. art. 27(1), at 65-66, 32 1.L.M. at 1509.
87. Id art. 28, at 66-67, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
88. Id. art. 29(1), at 67, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
89. Id
90. Id art. 36-37, at 70-71, 32 I.L.M. at 1511.
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For example, the enforcement procedure calls for sanctions only upon a
finding that the party has engaged in a "persistent pattern of failure...
to effectively enforce its occupational safety and health, child labor, or
minimum wage technical labor standards .... "' The terms "persistent"
pattern of failure, or a lack of "effective" enforcement, are vague. 92 In
addition, Article 49 carves out an enormous exception to the cross-
border enforcement procedure. Article 49 states that a party does not fail
to effectively enforce its labor. laws if its action or inaction either:
(a) reflects a reasonable exercise of the agency's or the official's
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or
compliance matters; or
(b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to en-
forcement in respect of other labor matters determined to have
higher priorities .... 9
There is almost no instance, at least under U.S. labor law, in which
government failure to enforce a labor law cannot be characterized so as
to fall within one of these exceptions. The exceptions found in Article
49 provide a legal excuse for almost all nonenforcement. In light of
these broad exceptions, it is difficult to imagine any situation in which
the agreement's procedures for obtaining labor law enforcement would
apply.
While the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement's enforcement procedures
appear to be limited to complaints involving nonenforcement of laws
regarding occupational health and safety, child labor, and minimum
wages, some union groups have argued that they have a broader applica-
bility. In February 1994, two U.S. unions filed complaints concerning
alleged violations of the right to organize unions. The Teamsters Union
and the International Union of Electrical Workers complained that
General Electric Corporation and Honeywell, Inc., respectively, violated
the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement's protection of free association and
union organizing contained in Annex I by firing workers for organizing
activities in their Mexican subsidiaries. In April, the U.S. National
Administrative Office (NAO), the agency in the U.S. that determines
91. Id. art. 36(2)(b), at 70, 32 I.L.M. at 1511 (emphasis added). Sanctions can take the
form of monetary fines or trade sanctions such as the imposition of import duties on the
violator's goods.
92. Article 49 defines "persistent pattern" as a sustained or recurring pattern of practice.
See id. art. 49, at 76-78, 32 I.L.M. at 1513-14.
93. Id. at 77, 32 1.L.M. at 1513.
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whether to bring complaints under the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement,
agreed to review the charges.94 While the NAO could have used this
case to give a broad interpretation to Annex I of the NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement, it decided against that course. Instead, on October 13, 1994,
the NAO said it had found no evidence that Mexico had failed to en-
force its labor laws and dismissed the complaints.95
As currently drafted and interpreted, the NAFTA Labor Side Agree-
ment will not equalize labor standards within North America, nor will it
harmonize or bring consistency to the vastly different collective bargain-
ing systems that exist within North America.96 At best, the NAFTA
Labor Side Agreement might lead to more vigorous enforcement of each
country's own pre-existing labor laws in some limited areas.
2. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Another North American model of transnational labor regulation is
the application of domestic labor regulation extraterritorially. From a
United States standpoint, this means applying U.S. labor law to labor
disputes that occur beyond U.S. boundaries, or to parties who are not
U.S - citizens. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is becoming an increasingly
important feature of American labor law. It is a trend that can be seen in
all three branches of government. U.S. courts are beginning to interpret
some of the labor relations statutes in ways that give them extraterritori-
al reach; Congress has recently amended two major labor law statutes so
as to make them expressly extraterritorial; and the Executive Branch has
begun to condition trading privileges for foreign countries on compli-
ance with American labor standards.
(a) Case Law on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
It is often stated in labor cases that American law does not apply
extraterritorially. 97 The no-extraterritoriality maxim was first expressed
in a nonlabor case decided in 1909. In American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.,98 the Supreme Court stated that courts should presume that
the jurisdiction of American statutes was restricted to American territo-
94. See 145 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 493 (Apr. 25, 1994). For a text of the complaints, see
In re Honeywell, Inc., 390 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 9499 (Mar. 4, 1994). See also McGuinness,
supra note 9, at 587-90.
95. 197 Daily Labor Reporter (BNA) AA-I (Oct. 14, 1994).
96. See Rozwood & Walker, supra note 30, at 345-47.
97. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil C6, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., Inc.
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
98. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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ry.99 In 1925, the Supreme Court applied the no-extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion presumption to a labor case for the first time."° The case, New York
Central Ry. v. Chisholm,'0 ' arose under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA) - a workers compensation statute for the railroads. The
Court held that the FELA did not apply to U.S. citizens working for
U,S. railroads who were injured in Canada.'
2
In 1949, in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,'0 3 the United States Su-
preme Court again invoked the no-extraterritoriality presumption and
refused to apply the federal eight-hour law to U.S. construction workers
hired by a U.S. corporation to perform construction work on projects in
foreign countries.4 The Foley Court explained the presumption against
extraterritoriality as a rule of construction. It noted that while Congress
had the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundary of
the United States, that intent must be expressly indicated in the legisla-
tion itself. Since Congress ordinarily is concerned only with domestic
conditions, the Court ruled that in the absence of clear language by
Congress to the contrary, it will presume that legislation is not extrater-
ritorial.'05
In the decades after Foley Bros., the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have applied the presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction to preclude the application of many federal labor laws to
workers outside U.S. territory, including minimum wage laws,'06 collec-
tive bargaining laws," 7 the Age Discrimination Act,0 8 and the labor
protective provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act." 9 In these cases,
99. Id. at 355-57 (no jurisdiction for alleged Sherman Act violations that occurred in
Costa Rica and Panama).
100. There were 19th century applications of this principle in cases involving slavery,
which were arguably "labor cases." See Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially:
Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1273, 1287 (1990) [hereinafter Constructing the State Extraterritorially].
101. 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
102. Id. at 32. For a discussion and critique of 19th century cases involving extraterritori-
al jurisdiction issues in cases involving slavery, see Constructing the State Extraterritorially,
supra note 100, at 1287-89.
103. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
104. Id. at 285.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, 932 F.2d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 1991).
107. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 22
(1963) (National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not apply extraterritorially); Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957). See also Air Line Dispatchers Asslu v.
National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (no extraterritorial jurisdiction
for the Railway Labor Act).
108. See Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
109. Van Blaricom v. Burlington N. R.R., 17 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 1994).
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the courts relied on the Foley Bros. rationale that Congress was pre-
sumed to have been concerned primarily with domestic problems when
it legislated. They treated the no-extraterritoriality presumption as a rule
of construction regarding Congressional intent.
While the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction remained
firm for a long time in labor cases, there were departures in commercial
law cases almost from the outset. In 1911, barely two years after the
American Banana Co. decision, the Supreme Court applied the Sherman
Act to an agreement made in England to monopolize U.S. tobacco
imports and exports in the United States v. American Tobacco Co.
case. "0 In 1927, the Court applied the Sherman Act to American compa-
nies who conspired to conduct a monopoly wholly in Mexico in United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp."' It justified its result by reasoning that the
monopoly would have direct effects within the United States."12 In Sisal
Sales Corp., the Court avoided overruling American Banana Co. by
narrowly interpreting "extraterritorial" so as to exclude from its defini-
tion those deliberate acts by conspirators that "brought about forbidden
results within the United States."
' 1 3
In 1945, Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit articulated a
new principle for extraterritorial jurisdiction. In U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of
America,' l4 he held that the Sherman Act applied to a group of non-U.S.
nationals who allegedly formed a conspiracy to control a product mar-
ket, even though the acts occurred outside the United States and there
was no domestic conduct on which to base jurisdiction."5 Judge Hand
argued that there was jurisdiction under the Sherman Act when a defen-
dant outside the territorial United States had acted with the intent of
producing an effect inside the U.S. or had taken actions which, in fact,
produced a domestic effect." 6 This new principle of jurisdiction based
on domestic intent or effect led to vastly expanded use of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, particularly in the areas of antitrust, securities, and trade-
mark laws. 7
110. 221 U.S. 106, 184 (1911).
111. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
112. Id. at 276.
113. Id. See generally Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 608-13 (1990); Michael
F. Beausang, Jr., The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DICK. L. REV. 187,
189-90 (1966).
114. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
115. Id. at 443.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(extraterritorial application of Sherman Act); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
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In 1993, the Supreme Court expanded the extraterritorial reach of
the Sherman Antitrust Act still further. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California,"' the Court applied the Act to conduct which occurred
exclusively in England and which was lawful under British law. The
defendants, U.S. and foreign insurers and reinsurers, were accused of
agreeing to boycott certain U.S. insurers in order to force them to
change the terms of the coverage they were offering to their customers.
The foreign defendants, together with the British government as amicus
curiae, argued that the conduct was perfectly legal under British law,
and that to apply the Sherman Act to such conduct would disrupt a
comprehensive regulatory. scheme of the insurance and reinsurance
market which the British Parliament had established." 9 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, finding that there was no actual conflict
between U.S. law and British law. Rather, the Court stated that neither
the Sherman Act nor the British law required the defendants to engage
in conduct that violated the other country's laws. It held that the defen-
dants could only engage in conduct which was lawful under both sets of
legal rules." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. made it clear that the Court will
place few, if any, limits on the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
antitrust laws.'
Despite the steady expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in com-
mercial law cases, courts refused to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction in
labor cases for a long time.12 However, in recent years, the rationale for
finding no-extraterritorial jurisdiction has shifted away from the Ameri-
can Banana Co. presumption approach toward an international
law/comity approach. For example, in ILA v. Ariadne Shipping Co.,'
23 a
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (extraterritorial application of Sherman Act); Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (trademark claim under Lanham Act applied
extraterritorially); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (extraterritorial
jurisdiction for Securities Exchange Act cases).
118. 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993).
119. Id. at 2910, 125 L.Ed.2d at 640.
120. Id. at 2910-11, 125 L.Ed.2d at 640-41.
121. After Hartford Fire Ins. Co., the only limitation on the extraterritorial reach of the
Sherman Act, and other commercial laws by analogy, is Congressional intent. However, as
Professor Lea Brilmeyer has shown, Congressional intent in this area is a legal fiction in
which intent is often imputed on the basis of unstated judicial policy preferences. See Lea
Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Consti-
tutional Appraisal, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 11, 35.
122. Turley, supra note 113, at 617-18. See also Jonathan Turley, Transnational Dis-
crimination and the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REv. 339 (1990)
(discussing employment discrimination statutes which have proven controversial for courts in
resolving extraterritorial claims).
123. 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
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1970 maritime labor case, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB had
jurisdiction over a U.S. union's picketing of a foreign ship which em-
ployed foreign and U.S. longshore workers. In reaching its result, the
Court distinguished a long line of maritime labor cases where the no-
extraterritorial jurisdiction presumption had been applied. The Court
reasoned that the picketing in ILA v. Ariadne dealt with the wages paid
to American workers and hence did not seek to interfere with the labor
relations of a foreign vessel. 24
In 1991, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted an international
law/comity approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the case of
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. ["Aaramco"].2 There the Court
refused to apply Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act to
a U.S. citizen working for a U.S. firm in Saudi Arabia. In explaining its
conclusion, the Aaramco Court did not speak of the implied or express
territorial reach of the legislation. Indeed, Title VII contains both statu-
tory language and legislative history which manifest a Congressional
intent that the statute be applied to extraterritorial conduct.'26 Rather, the
Court justified its result solely on the basis of international law princi-
ples. The Court said it should not interpret a statute in a way that causes
a conflict with the laws of another nation. Thus, it found no jurisdiction.
As the Court's view of the territorial reach of labor legislation has
expanded since the 1970s, the National Labor Relations Board's
(NLRB's) notion of the territorial reach of its own jurisdiction has also
expanded. In 1975, the NLRB applied the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 2 7 extraterritorially to an American corporation that had dis-
criminated against an American employee who worked at the company's
Canadian facility. The employee was fired for attempting to unionize the
company's Canadian location.'28 The NLRB used a center-of-gravity
analysis to determine that it had jurisdiction. It found that a number of
factors indicated that the employee's job, while physically in Canada,
was actually governed by policies set in the United States.'29 This ap-
proach directly contradicted the Supreme Court's approach in New York
Central Ry. and Foley Bros.
In 1977, the NLRB reversed its longstanding policy of declining to
assert jurisdiction over the commercial activities of foreign governments
124. 397 U.S. at 198-201.
125. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
126. 499 U.S. at 266-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
128. Freeport Transp., Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 833 (1975).
129. Id at 833.
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and their agencies operating within the United States.13° In 1979, the
NLRB ruled that the NLRA applied to a U.S. ship operating within
Brazil.' 3 ' The Board found that because the ship carried a U.S. flag, it
was, for legal purposes, U.S. territory to which the laws of the United
States could be applied.33 All of these developments signalled an expan-
sion of the NLRB's view of the statutory and discretionary scope of its
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In the past few years, the circumstances in which courts and the
Labor Board have applied the NLRA extraterritorially have expanded
significantly. The Second Circuit has held that the Railway Labor Act
has extraterritorial application in a case in which a U.S. union bargained
with a U.S. carrier over working conditions on foreign soil.' 33 There are
presently two cases pending for review by the full NLRB which involve
the issue of the NLRA's application to employees working overseas. In
both cases, the administrative law judge applied the statute
extraterritorially and the case is before the NLRB on appeal." In two
recent cases, federal appellate courts have applied the NLRA to extrater-
ritorial conduct. In 1992, the Eleventh Circuit applied the secondary
boycott prohibitions to an American union that had requested Japanese
unions to exert economic pressure against their own Japanese employ-
er.' 35 In doing so, the Court rejected the union's argument that there was
no extraterritorial application of the NLRA. It held that union conduct
which had the "intent and effect" of gaining an advantage in a labor
dispute in the U.S. was within the reach of the statute. 36 The court went
on to reinterpret the presumption against extraterritoriality as "a pre-
sumption that Congress intended to avoid 'clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord.' ""v
130. State Bank of India, 229 N.L.R.B. 838 (1977). See also The North American Soccer
League, 236 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322-25 (1978) (Bd. Member Murphy, dissenting in part)
(arguing that Board should include Canadian soccer players in bargaining unit of North
American Soccer League).
131. Alcoa Marine Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1979).
132. Id.
133. Local 553 v. Eastern Air lines, 695 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1983); contra Independent
Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2520
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that the Railway Labor Act did not apply to foreign-based employ-
ees).
134. Avco Corp. and International Union, 313 N.L.R.B. 1357 (1994); Computer Science
Raytheon and I.B.E.W., Case No. 12-RC-7612.
135. Dowd v. International Longshoremens' Ass'n, 975 F.2d 779 (11 th Cir. 1992).
136. Id. at 788.
137. Id. at 789 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)).
1016 [Vol. 16:987
Labor and the Global Economy
In 1994, the Fifth Circuit held that the NLRB had jurisdiction over
unfair labor practice charges filed by U.S nationals who were employed
on a U.S. vessel that was operating indefinitely in Hong Kong. 138 In
N.L.R.B. v. Dredge Operators, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the NLRB's
assertion of jurisdiction to hear an unfair labor practice charge asserted
against a shipping corporation. The shipping corporation required the
shipper-employer to bargain with the union elected to represent the
ship's crew. The ship was a U.S. flag vessel, but at the time of the
relevant acts, it operated exclusively in Hong Kong. The Fifth Circuit
held the NLRB had statutory jurisdiction because the ship was a U.S.
flag ship, and thus was American territory. Therefore, the court said that
the application of the NLRA was not extraterritorial. 139 The court reject-
ed the argument that the NLRB should not exercise discretionary juris-
diction on grounds of international comity, finding that there was no
actual conflict between application of the NLRA and the requirements
of Hong Kong law.14°
The no-extraterritorial principle has not evaporated in labor law, but
its rationale has changed. For example, the Second Circuit recently
refused to uphold a jurisdictional claim arising under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act brought by foreign workers against
their employer, a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, in Labor
Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc. 41 However, in explaining
its decision, the Court relied on an international law or comity rationale.
It said that to construe Section 301 to "enforce collective bargaining
agreements between foreign workers and foreign corporations doing
work in foreign countries"" would lead to "'embarrassment in foreign
affairs.' ,143
All of these case law developments indicate that there has been a
change in the attitudes of courts and agencies about the scope of juris-
diction to U.S. labor laws. These changes are consistent with similar
changes occurring in the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment.
138. N.L.R.B. v. Dredge Operators, Inc., 19 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1994).
139. Id. at 211.
140. Id. at 213-14.
141. 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 195.
143. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10. 19 (1963)).
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(b) Extraterritorial Provisions in Labor Legislation
On two occasions in the past ten years, Congress expressly provided
for extraterritorial application of certain U.S. labor laws. It amended the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1984,144 and the Civil Rights
Act in 1991,14 making both statutes applicable to U.S. corporations
employing U.S. workers and operating overseas." Each of these amend-
ments was enacted in response to Supreme Court rulings to the con-
trary, 47 and both involve anti-discrimination laws. In addition, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is coextensive in its extraterri-
torial application with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, so that it also
applies to American corporations operating overseas.'
In 1992 Congress considered a bill that would make the National
Labor Relations Act apply to all U.S. companies and their subsidiaries
operating in any country that is a signatory to a Free Trade Agreement.
The provision was attached to the ill-fated Workplace Democracy Act of
1992, which was stalled in the House Education and Labor Commit-
tee. 49 However, these legislative developments demonstrate a legislative
willingness to apply some U.S. labor laws extraterritorially - a willing-
ness which may soon be extended to other U.S. laws.
(c) Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Labor
Law Through Trade Pacts
In addition to recent judicial and Congressional efforts to make U.S.
labor law extraterritorial, and apply it as such, there have been similar
developments from the Executive Branch. Prior to NAFTA, several U.S,
trade laws contained provisions which permitted the Executive Branch
144. Older Americans Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767 (1984)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)).
145. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(t) (Supp. III 1991)).
146. See generally Joy Cherian, Enforcement of American Workers' Rights Abroad, 43
LAB. L.J. 563, 563-64 (1992) (discussing these amendments).
147. See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1984). See generally
Derek G. Barella, Checking the "Trigger-Happy" Congress: The Extraterritorial Extension of
Federal Employment Laws Requires Prudence, 69 IND. L.J. 889, 899-903 (1994) (discussing
the court cases that prompted amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
the Civil Rights Act); James M. Zimmerman, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Labor
Laws: Congress' Flawed Extension of the ADEA, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103, 115-18 (1988)
(discussing the amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
148. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (6odified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(Supp. I1 1991))
149. Barella, supra note 147, at 899-900.
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to withhold trade privileges with other countries that did not give their
workers certain basic protections, including protection for the right to
organize. Of these laws, the most notable were the 1983 Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI), the 1984 Amendments to the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP), the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, and the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation Act of 1985." All of these acts gave the
Executive Branch the power to apply U.S. labor laws extraterritofially
by importing their norms into trade decisions. These provisions have
been utilized from time to time by U.S. Presidents and by other execu-
tive agencies that regulate trade. For example, in 1987, President Rea-
gan, acting pursuant to the 1984 amendments to the GSP, denied trade
preferences to Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Romania on the basis of their
alleged labor rights violations.
15'
III. COMPARING AND EVALUATING THE FOUR MODELS
Part II identified and described the four models of transnational
labor regulation that have emerged in recent years. The four models can
be compared along two dimensions. First, the two European models of
transnational labor regulation are integrative, seeking to unify labor
norms and labor standards. In comparison, the two North American
models are interpenetrative, seeking to enforce cross-border norms on a
one-time, situation-specific basis. Second, the models can be distin-
guished according to their respective implementation requirements. Two
of the models - preemptive legislation and cross-border enforcement
- are multilateral in the sense that they rely for their implementation
on actions by several countries jointly implementing a particular labor
standard. Neither preemptive legislation nor cross-border enforcement
can occur unless two or more nations decide to apply a particular labor
regulation. In contrast, the other two models - harmonization and
150. For a description of each of these measures and others that preceded them, see
Steve Chamovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading
Regime: A Historical Overview, 125 INT'L LAB. REV. 565 (1987) [hereinafter Influence of
International Labor Standards]; Steven Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards and International
Trade, 20 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 61 (1986). See also Thomas R. Howard, Note, Free Trade
Between the United States and Mexico: Minimizing the Adverse Effects on American Workers,
18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 507, 518-22 (1992) (discussing U.S. initiatives to link labor
conditions to trade); Cowie & French, supra note 73, at 16-19; Ian C. Ballon, The Implica-
tions of Making the Denial of Internationally Recognized Worker Rights Actionable Under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1988).
151. Charnovitz, Influence of International Labor Standards, supra note 150, at 573-74.
In 1987, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation also withdrew insurance coverage from
projects in Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and Ethiopia for their failure to adopt internation-
ally recognized worker rights. Id.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction - are unilateral in the sense that they can be
implemented by the unilateral action of one country. Extraterritorial
jurisdiction is the ultimate unilateral form of transnational regulation; it
is one country imposing its own, unilaterally-devised domestic labor
standards on another country. Harmonization is also unilateral in its
implementation - it requires that each country alter its own domestic
laws in order to "approximate" the laws of other nations.'
Using these two dimensions of comparison, the four models can be
arranged in the following four-part box:
FOUR MODELS OF TRANSNATIONAL LABOR REGULATION
multilateral unilateral
implementation implementation




Seeing the dimensions of similarity and difference makes it possible to
evaluate the four models and to develop criteria to help decide which
one to advocate.
To approach the policy question, however, it is necessary to con-
sider the objectives of transnational labor regulation. Part I described the
various problems that globalization causes for labor: the weakening of
labor's bargaining power; the potential for a labor standards race-to-the-
bottom; regulatory competition; the potential for organizational fragmen-
tation due to an inability to organize on an international basis; and the
deterioration of labor's role in national and international political life.
This section explores how the different models of transnational labor
regulation discussed in detail in Part II address each of those problems.
In addition, this section addresses several other goals that are often
posited for transnational labor regulation, goals such as raising labor
standards, increasing trade by eliminating regulatory barriers to trade,
152. While harmonization assumes that a country will act unilaterally when it revises its
labor laws to conform to another set of legal norms, one could argue that harmonization is
multilateral in that a multilateral agency sets the norms and imposes the sanctions and incen-
tives for a country to harmonize in the first place. However, within the context of a multilat-
erally-established harmonization directive, harmonization is unilateral because it requires each
member state to act unilaterally in devising and revising its domestic regulations.
1020 [Vol. 16:987
Labor and the Global Economy
and promoting international cooperation. The latter two differ from the
other goals discussed in that they aim to benefit nonlabor groups -
business, consumers, citizens, and so forth. These additional goals must
factor into any policy conclusion about desirable modes of labor regula-
tion.
As we shall see, each of the models promotes different goals, and
some models are impediments to the attainment of other goals. Indeed,
there is no ideal model that can achieve all of the goals of transnational
labor regulation.
A. Preemptive Legislation
The model of regulation that is most likely to limit runaway shops,
prevent labor standards races-to-the-bottom and discourage regulatory
competition is the one that is most effective at setting uniform labor
standards across national boundaries. Uniformity in labor standards
would prevent the phenomenon of regulation-shopping, in which cor-
porations move to the least restrictive regulatory environment. Unifor-
mity would also eliminate union fears that by advocating protective
legislation, they are contributing to capital flight and costing union
members their jobs. Where uniformity in labor regulation cannot be
achieved for either political or pragmatic reasons, an alternative is to
adopt regulations that set a floor of rights, such as a minimum wage or
minimum safety standards, above which parties can further negotiate. If
the floor of labor rights is high enough, it will also have a deterrent
effect on runaway shops and races-to-the-bottom, although not as power-
ful a deterrent as uniform labor standards.
In theory, uniformity can be achieved most effectively through the
EU model of preemptive legislation since the very purpose of this model
is to set uniform employment standards. To the extent that the EU
Commission has the power to set rules and enforce regulations for labor
standards in its member countries, it minimizes the possibility of a labor
standards race-to-the-bottom.
In addition to setting uniform standards directly, the EU could
legislate rules that would encourage the development of transnational
unions which could then bargain for uniform transnational labor stan-
dards. That is, preemptive legislation has the potential of creating a
uniform set of legal regulations to facilitate cross-border collective bar-
gaining. This would make it more feasible for unions to organize and
coordinate bargaining strategies on a transnational basis. Accordingly,
preemptive legislation is a strategy that could prevent organizational
fragmentation and counteract the weakening of labor's bargaining power
that globalization initially creates.
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A further strength of the preemptive legislation model is that it
furthers the goal of encouraging international cooperation. Indeed, both
of the European integrative approaches have as their goal not merely
integration, but actual unification of regulatory regimes. These ap-
proaches carry the prospect of developing, over time, shared norms and
collaborative means by which to implement those norms. Furthermore,
the integrative models are part of an economic strategy that has a polit-
ical goal - to achieve the unification of Europe into a single political,
juridical and economic unit. Thus, the preemptive legislation model, as
well as the harmonization model, is likely to foster international coop-
eration and interdependency that will make overt international aggres-
sion between EU members less likely.
The limitations on the preemptive legislation model are primarily
practical ones. The model requires multilateral action for its implemen-
tation, and it is extremely difficult to gain the necessary consensus to
actually set labor standards. To date, the European Commission has only
utilized its legislative power to set labor standards on a few issues, and
it has not attempted to set any uniform rules governing collective bar-
gaining, strikes, and other forms of collective action. Indeed, most
observers predict that the EU is unlikely to attempt any preemptive
legislative, or even harmonization, in the area of unionism or collective
bargaining in the foreseeable future. Therefore, while the preemptive
legislation model could theoretically eliminate barriers to trade by
equalizing labor standards and labor rights, in practice it is not likely to
do so in the near future. And, without a uniform framework of legal
rules to govern collective bargaining, the preemptive legislation model
cannot prevent organizational fragmentation or the weakening of labor's
bargaining power that globalization entails.
There is a further drawback to the preemptive legislation model.
Both integrative models are well suited to further the goals of interna-
tional cooperation, world peace, and the establishment of a floor of
labor standards, but they are not necessarily the models that will provide
the highest labor standards or the best legal protection for workers. The
integrative models rely on consensus between nations, so that there is a
tendency for least common denominator regulations to emerge. This is
the phenomenon of "harmonization downward" that has been widely
discussed amongst scholars in the European Community.'53 The dynamic
of harmonization downward was apparent in 1989 when the EU nations
153. See, e.g., Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 3, at 152; Manfred McDowell, NAFTA
and the EC Social Dimension, 20 LAB. STUD. J. 30, 40-47. See also Charny, supra note 7, at
451-52 (arguing that harmonization leads to levelling downward of disclosure requirements in
corporate law).
1022 [Vol. 16:987
Labor and the Global Economy
could not enact the Social Charter due to the objections of Great Britain.
It is a dynamic that could, under an integrative model of labor regula-
tion, lead to the triumph of the weakest regulatory regime.
There is yet another problem with the model of preemptive legisla-
tion. One of the most important goals of transnational labor regulation is
to preserve a role for labor in political life and to preserve labor's
political clout." The preemptive legislation model diminishes the role
of labor unions in politics by taking issues of labor relations out of the
reach of the national political processes and placing them in multilateral
agencies. 5 5 Preemptive legislation by definition moves labor legislation
from the national political arena into a multilateral arena. At present,
unions exist in nation-specific environments; they are not major players
in transnational decision-making bodies. In the EU Commission, votes
are cast by country, not by political party or constituency-based group.
Yet national unions are rarely powerful enough in their home countries
to be empowered to speak for the country's national interest in an
international policy-making Setting. As a result, under preemptive legis-
lation, the influence of national unions becomes diluted and mediated."5
B. Harmonization
The harmonization model of transnational labor regulation is similar
to preemptive legislation in most respects. That is, it fosters uniformity
in labor standards, thus counteracting labor standards races-to-the-bot-
tom. It also establishes a floor of labor standards and fosters internation-
al labor cooperation.
There are, however, some differences in the ability of the two
integrative models to achieve the policy goals discussed above. First,
harmonization, unlike preemptive legislation, relies on unilateral action
by each member country. This feature makes it highly unlikely that
directives on labor standards will be implemented in the same way in all
the EU countries. To the contrary, harmonization permits a wide range
of variation as to the appropriate way to implement directives. Thus,
harmonization is less likely to create uniformity in labor regulations than
154. See supra part I.D.
155. This has sometimes been called the "democratic deficit" in the European Communi-
ty. See Gill, supra note 32, at 166; McDowell, supra note 153, at 45. See also ROGER
BLANPAIN, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 25
(1991).
156. For a thoughtful description of the role of interest groups in EC policy-making, see
Michael J. Georges, Interest Intermediation in the EC After Maastricht, Paper Delivered at
Conference on The Political Economy of the New Europe held at Cornell University (Nov.
13-14, 1992) (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
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will preemptive legislation. To the extent that uniformity in regulation is
desirable as an antidote to labor standards races-to-the-bottom, harmoni-
zation is less effective than preemptive legislation.
Harmonization can, however, establish a floor of rights. But in
doing so, it shares with preemptive legislation the potential problem of
setting a least common denominator floor, and thus of levelling down-
ward.
Harmonization has several advantages over the other models as well.
First, harmonization relies on unilateral action for implementation after
shared norms are articulated in the form of directives. From a practical
vantage point, this suggests that as difficult as it may be to enact labor
directives at the transnational level due to the difficulties of reaching
international consensus, it might be easier to reach consensus when
countries know they will retain autonomy at the implementation stage.
Indeed, the fact that the EU has many more directives than r~glements
on labor issues bears out this insight.
Second, harmonization is a model of labor regulation that secures a
larger role for labor in national politics than does preemptive legislation.
As with preemptive legislation, harmonization directives require that
legal norms be set multilaterally, so the role of domestic labor unions in
the norm-setting process is diminished. However, unlike preemptive
legislation, harmonization requires legislation to be enacted at the do-
mestic level to implement the directives. It thus presumes that labor
regulations will be debated, adopted, and interpreted at the level of the
nation-state. Consequently, harmonization will enable, indeed require,
unions to continue their efforts to influence lawmakers and other deci-
sion-makers at the national level.
Another possible advantage of harmonization over preemptive
legislation is that it is possibly more conducive to international peace
and cooperation. Harmonization sets in motion a process by which
countries bring their regulatory frameworks into consistency with one
another. It does not involve the external imposition of regulations, but it
does provide structured incentives for nations to alter their regulations in
a consistent way. Given the emphasis on internal change of a country's
regulations, harmonization may be a process that engenders less conflict,
opposition, and backlash than preemptive legislation.
C. Cross-Border Monitoring
As discussed, the NAFTA model of cross-border monitoring and
enforcement has little to contribute to the goal of establishing uniform
labor standards or a floor of labor rights. The NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement's cross-border enforcement model does not seek to raise or
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equalize labor standards. To the contrary, it provides disincentives for
member states to legislate labor protections because each state can be
sanctioned for not enforcing its own labor regulations. Furthermore, be-
cause NAFTA removes trade barriers without providing uniformity in
labor regulation, each country stands to lose business if it imposes a
higher level of regulation than do other countries. Therefore, cross-
border monitoring encourages races-to-the-bottom and regulatory compe-
tition, resulting in the lowering of labor standards.
157
While labor is interested in finding a framework for transnational
labor regulation that eliminates or minimizes the possibility of labor
standards races-to-the-bottom, there are other groups who contend that
such races-to-the-bottom are not a problem from a policy-making per-
spective. Many free-traders argue that efforts to limit races-to-the-bottom
are disguised protectionism. They argue that permitting firms to relocate
in the lowest labor standards environment is desirable because it increas-
es trade and creates more efficient utilization of global resources, which
in turn fosters greater global wealth. 58
If the goal of transnational labor regulation is to increase trade and
eliminate labor regulations that act as barriers to trade, then one would
select a model of labor regulation that minimizes regulation, lowers
labor standards, and discourages regulatory uniformity. Thus, in fur-
therance of this policy goal, one would choose the NAFTA model of
cross-border enforcement and monitoring. But if one wanted to protect
labor standards, one would have to select a different model.
D. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The other North American model of labor regulation is extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction of national law. This model, in contrast to cross-border
monitoring, can promote regulatory uniformity. Extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is the application of one country's labor laws to other countries.
This method of achieving uniform labor standards requires only unilat-
eral action, making it relatively easy to implement. However, extra-
territorial application of domestic law unifies labor standards on a
piecemeal basis. Under it, some particular U.S. labor laws are applied to
some other countries, but there is no systematic application or enforce-
ment of an entire regulatory regime. It is a model that cannot create
uniformity in all facets of employment regulation and, therefore, it has
only limited ability to deter labor standards races-to-the-bottom or
regulatory competition.
157. Cowie & French, supra note 73, at 5-6, 20.
158. See Howse and Trebilcock, supra note 19, at 54-59.
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Extraterritorial jurisdiction, like cross-border monitoring, is not
integrative in its aspirations, and thus will not contribute to the formu-
lation of shared norms and uniform standards between nations. In addi-
tion, the extraterritorial jurisdiction model is detrimental to the goal of
international peace and cooperation. To the contrary, the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by U.S. courts and Congress is likely to
create tensions in the international arena and could potentially
destabilize international relations. 59 The ability of a nation-state to
legislate and execute laws governing its own citizens is viewed as an
indelible mark of sovereignty. Nations react with intense hostility when
their citizens and activities within their own borders are made the sub-
ject of investigation and sanction by a foreign nation applying foreign
rules and procedures. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is thus a model that is
already producing international discord and is likely to produce more. 
60
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law in the commercial law area
has been a particular source of controversy in recent years.' 6' Some
countries have enacted blocking legislation designed to prevent the
application of U.S. law within their territories." There is no reason to
assume that extraterritorial application of U.S. labor law will be greeted
any more favorably by the international community.
Despite its dangers, however, extraterritorial jurisdiction has some
powerful virtues to recommend it. If the goal of transnational labor
regulation is to provide the best protection for labor, rather than to.
encourage international cooperation, then extraterritorial jurisdiction
might be the most effective approach. Under this approach, one country
simply imposes its domestic labor laws on another country without
having to achieve multilateral consensus. As a result, extraterritorial
jurisdiction is a model that has great potential for raising labor standards
in other countries. However, this can occur only if the country imposing
its labor regulations has relatively higher labor standards and a well
developed system of labor rights in the first place. If the labor
protections of the country exercising such extraterritorial jurisdiction are
weak, this model will not protect workers domestically or
transnationally.
159. See Barella, supra note 147, at 918 (urging Congress to use treaties rather than
extraterritorial application of labor law to achieve labor standards goals).
160. See, e.g., Cherian, supra note 146, at 564 (Commissioner of E.E.O.C. reports that
American companies complain that extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. employment laws
renders them uncompetitive).
161. See 'Brilmeyer, supra note 121, at II (noting hostility of other countries to extrater-
ritorial application of Sherman Antitrust Act); Zimmerman, supra note 148, at 120-25
(describing international reactions to extraterritorial application of U.S. laws).
162. Zimmerman, supra note 147, at 120-21; Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of Foreign.
Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 253 (1982).
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There is a stronger argument in favor of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Both North American interpenetration models retain a central role for
domestic governments to set domestic labor standards., Both cross-border
monitoring and extraterritorial jurisdiction are models in which labor
regulations are enacted domestically and enforced by domestic legal
processes. Rather than eradicate the role of domestic legislatures and
courts, the interpenetration models reinforce them. Therefore they also
retain a much greater role for labor unions to influence labor standards
by means of the domestic political process than do either of the integra-
tive approaches. For this reason, the interpenetration models are less
disruptive of existing organizations, constituencies, vested interests, and
power relations than are the European ones. With cross-border monitor-
ing, the beneficial effect of preserving labor's role in domestic politics is
offset by the destructive impact on labor of the transnational race-to-the-
bottom that the model encourages. If the goal is to preserve unionism as
a vital element in our democracy, one would select extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Part III described four models of transnational labor regulation that
exist in the Western world today, and assessed the ability of each of the
four models to address the problems 'that globalization causes for labor.
It is evident that each of the four models of transnational labor regula-
tion has different strengths and different weaknesses in relation to each
of the possible goals of transnational labor regulation. To choose be-
tween the models, it is necessary to set priorities between goals, as no
existing model can achieve them all.
For example, preemptive legislation has the capacity to create uni-
formity of labor regulation, eliminate races-to-the-bottom, and promote
international cooperation. But the price of adopting this model is to
relocate the locus of labor regulation from a national to transnational
fora, thereby diminishing labor's role in politics. Unless some mecha-
nism is established at the EU level to reintroduce labor as a player, with
the ability to articulate its interests separately from each nation's own
"national interest," the preemptive legislation model could lead to the
gradual fragmentation, disorganization, and disintegration of organized
labor throughout Europe.
At the other extreme, extraterritorial jurisdiction retains a strong role
for labor. in domestic politics, and it has the potential to provide uniform
labor standards, at least in some areas. However, the primary price of
this model is escalation of international tensions and the potential for
international conflict.
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NAFTA, which imposes no substantive cross-border labor regula-
tions, comes close to a no-regulation regime. Accordingly, this model
solves none of the problems that globalization poses for labor.
Harmonization could be the perfect mid-point - providing some
uniformity while retaining some role for domestic politics. However, it
could also be an unstable equilibrium, threatening to tip over into pre-
emptive legislation if the directives become powerful mandates, and to a
no-regulation regime if the directives permit evasion and opting-out.
To conclude, none of the existing models can satisfy all objectives
for transnational labor regulations. And, there is no neutral policy-sci-
ence that can make these hard choices. However, by recognizing the
limitations of each model and the trade-offs they pose, it might be
possible to imagine a new model of transnational labor regulation, one
that draws from the strengths of each model and that avoids the prob-
lems that inhere in each one. Such a new form of transnational labor
regulation would be a first step toward ensuring that the emerging
global economy is fair, equitable and inclusive of all its citizens.
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